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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court erred when it refused to suppress Mr. Vivian's statements made to the
police after he was unlawfully seized. His statements were the "fruit" of the unlawful seizure,
and absent any showing of attenuation, his post-Miranda statements should have been
suppressed under the clear precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Following the hearing on the motion to suppress,1 the district court made the following
factual findings. (R., pp.79-87.) In April of 2019, Ada County Sheriffs Deputy Mark Brott
stopped Mr. Vivian for driving with non-working brake lights and Mr. Vivian disclosed his
driver's license was suspended. (R., p.80.) After talking with Mr. Vivian, Officer Brott returned
to his patrol car and ran the vehicle's plates, requested a K-9 assist, and wrote the citation.
(R., p.80.)
Then, Officer Brott "exited his patrol car carrying a completed citation and Vivian's
driver's license [and looked] repeatedly down the road toward the direction from which the K-9
officer ultimately arrived." (R., p.80.) After the K-9 unit arrived, Officer Brott talked with the
K-9 handler before returning to Mr. Vivian, ordering him out of his vehicle, and serving the
citation. (R., p.80.) While standing with Officer Brott, Mr. Vivian was informed the drug dog
had "alerted to a controlled substance." (R., p.81.) During the ensuing search of the vehicle, the

1

Deputy Brott testified at the suppression hearing. (Tr., p.11, L.8 - p.66, L.1.) The district court
additionally considered the transcript of the preliminary hearing, Officer Brott's bodycam video
(Exhibit A), the dog handler's bodycam video (Exhibit 2), and the officer's Incident Report
(Exhibit B.) (See Tr., p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.5, p.66, Ls.16-21.)

1

K-9 handling officer discovered a plastic baggy containing a substance that appeared to be
methamphetamine, along with a glass pipe. (R., p.81; Prelim.Tr., p.25, Ls.9-11.)
Prior to any Miranda warnings, Mr. Vivian made admissions regarding his prior use of
methamphetamine. (R., p.81.) After receiving Miranda warnings, and after being contacted by
the officer who discovered the drug evidence in his vehicle, Mr. Vivian made additional
admissions, including admitting to paying for the substance, and that he believed his finger prints
could have been on the bag. (R., p.81; Prelim.Tr., p.25, Ls.15-21.)
The State charged Mr. Vivian with possession a controlled substance and possession of
drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.9, 35.) Mr. Vivian filed a motion to suppress claiming the officer
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully extending the stop to wait for the arrival of
the drug dog. (R., pp.49-61.) He argued that pursuant to the exclusionary rule, the items found
in his vehicle, the results of their testing, and the statements he made, should be suppressed as
the tainted "fruit" of the Fourth Amendment violation. (R., pp.52, 55.)
The State filed an objection arguing the officer did not unlawfully extend the stop, and
alternatively, even if he did, the evidence would be admissible under the inevitable discovery
doctrine, which is an exception to the exclusionary rule.

(R., pp.62-74.)

Regarding the

admissibility of Mr. Vivian's post-Miranda statements, the State argued at the hearing that
Mr. Vivian "was Mirandized and post-Miranda those statements should come in." (Tr., p.90,
Ls. I 7-19.) However, the State did not argue, either in its briefing or at the hearing, that the post-

Miranda statements were sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the original, unlawful seizure
and search, or otherwise mention the multi-factored attenuation test. (See generally R., pp.6274; Tr., p.90, L.21 - p.91, L.7.)

2

The district court denied Mr. Vivian's motion, with the exception of his pre-Miranda
statements, which the court suppressed. (R., p.79.) The court agreed that Officer Brott had
extended the stop beyond its Fourth Amendment justification in order to wait for the drug dog.
(R., pp.82-83.) However, the district court agreed with the State that the items inside of the
vehicle - the methamphetamine and a pipe - would inevitably have been discovered. (R., p.85.)
The district court found that, even if the stop had not been extended and Mr. Vivian was free to
leave the scene, the vehicle would not have been moved, given that Mr. Vivian's license was
suspended and the vehicle had no working brake lights. (R., p.85.) The court found that because
the drug dog had already been summoned and was just seconds away, the dog would have
inevitably alerted, providing probable cause to search the vehicle resulting in the lawful
discovery of those items. (R., p.85.) Accordingly, the district court ruled that those items were
admissible. (R., p.85.) However, the court made no finding that any of Mr. Vivian's statements
were inevitably discoverable. (See generally R., pp.79-86.)
As noted above, the district court suppressed Mr. Vivian's pre-Miranda statements, but
not because it found the statements were the tainted "fruit" of the Fourth Amendment violation,
as Mr. Vivian had argued, but because they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 4779 (1966). (R., p.85.) The district court declined to suppress Mr. Vivian's postMiranda statements, concluding those statements were admissible, stating two reasons: (1) "It is
unclear whether Vivian moves to suppress the admissions he made post-Miranda"; and (2)
Mr. Vivian "has not argued or presented evidence his post-Miranda statement were coerced.
Therefore the court need not reach this issue." (R., p.86.)
Mr. Vivian later entered an agreement with the State and conditionally pled guilty to
possessing a controlled substance, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to

3

suppress. (R., pp.88-101.) The district court imposed judgment sentencing Mr. Vivian to five
years, with two years fixed, and placed him on probation.
appealed. (R., p.124.)

4

(R., p.106.) Mr. Vivian timely

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it declined to apply the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to
suppress Mr. Vivian's post-Miranda statements?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Declined To Apply The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary
Rule To Suppress Mr. Vivian's Post-Miranda Statements

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it refused to suppress Mr. Vivian's post-Miranda

statements as "fruit" of the unlawful seizure of his person. Under this Court's precedent, the
giving of Miranda warnings did not eliminate the taint of the Fourth Amendment violation, nor
did those warning prevent the application of the exclusionary rule. Because the State failed to
demonstrate the statements were admissible under any exception to the exclusionary rule,
Mr. Vivian' statements should have been suppressed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Bills, 166 Idaho

778, _, 463 P.3d 412, 414 (Ct. App. 2020). The appellate court accepts the trial court's findings
of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles. Id. "At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court." Id.

C.

Mr. Vivian Is Entitled To Suppression Of His Post-Miranda Statements As The Tainted
Fruit Of The Fourth Amendment Violation
The district court correctly concluded that Officer Brott unlawfully extended the traffic

stop, in violation of Mr. Vivian's Fourth Amendment rights. See State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605
(2016).

(R., pp.82-83.)

Therefore, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule,

Mr. Vivian was entitled to suppression all evidence obtained as the direct and indirect result of

6

his illegal detention, as the proverbial "fruit" of the poisonous tree, unless the State established
that the evidence was admissible under a specific exception to the exclusionary rule. State v.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720 (2017).
However, the district court erroneously declined to apply the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule to Mr. Vivian's statements, and instead decided their admissibility based solely
on whether the statements were made before or after Mr. Vivian was given Miranda warnings.
(See R., p.86.)

Consequently, the district court suppressed only Mr. Vivian's pre-Miranda

statements, and refused to suppress any statements Mr. Vivian made after the Miranda warnings.
(R., p.86.) This was error.

1.

The Giving Of Miranda Warnings Did Not Remove The Taint Of The Unlawful
Seizure

Initially, and contrary to the district court's finding that it was "unclear" whether
Mr. Vivian's motion sought suppression of his post-Miranda statements, Mr. Vivian's briefing
and oral argument plainly show that Mr. Vivian's motion to suppress all of his incriminating
statements resulting from the Fourth Amendment violation as the fruit of the poisonous tree,
without limitation. (See R., pp.52, 53; Tr., p.75, L.5 - p.76, L.7.)
Moreover, under this Court's clear precedent, regardless of the g1vmg of Miranda
warnings, statements made by a defendant in response to being confronted by police with the
fruits of an illegal search or seizure constitute fruit of the poisonous tree and are inadmissible,
absent a showing by the State that an exception to the exclusionary rule applies.

State v.

Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31 (2017) (defendant's post-Miranda admissions made once confronted
with the drugs seized from his pocket were fruits of the illegal search and should have been
suppressed); State v. Bills, 166 Idaho 778 (Ct. App. 2020) (defendant's post-Miranda statements
made when confronted with illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible fruit of the poisonous

7

tree); State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 239 (Ct. App. 1994) (same); State v. Tiersort, 145 Idaho 112,
120 (Ct. App. 2007) (same).
In Luna, the Court of Appeals stated that the exclusionary rule required suppression of
such statements, notwithstanding Miranda warnings, unless it was shown the statements
"occurred under circumstances where intervening events operated to break the causal chain
between the illegal police conduct and the making of the statement by a defendant." 126 Idaho
at 239. The Court noted that the trial court had admitted the evidence because the defendant had
waived his Miranda rights. Id.

The Court also observe that the Miranda warnings, which

protect Fifth Amendment rights, do not eliminate the taint of a Fourth Amendment violation nor
prevent the application of the exclusionary rule requiring suppression of all fruits derived from
the illegality. Id. The Court then set forth a quote from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982):
If Miranda warnings were viewed as a talisman that cured all Fourth Amendment
violations, then the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and
seizures would be reduced to a mere "form of words."

Luna, 126 Idaho at 239.
Accordingly, the Luna Court reversed the trial court's denial of suppression and held that
the defendant's statements, made after being confronted with evidence obtained from an illegal
search, should have been suppressed. 126 Idaho at 239.
In Downing, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of a defendant's
motion to suppress post-Miranda statements made on the heels of an illegal weapons search and
retrieval of drugs from the defendant's pockets.

163 Idaho at 31. The Court held that the

defendant's post-Miranda "admissions once confronted with the drugs in his pocket should have
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been suppressed," and no attenuation occurred, because his "admissions flowed directly from the
illegal search, with no intervening factors to consider." Id.
Most recently, in State v. Bills, the Court of Appeals applied the holdings in Downing and
Luna to reverse the denial of a defendant's motion to suppress post-Miranda warnings.

166

Idaho at _, 463 P.3d at 415-46. In Bills, the defendant had made incriminating post-Miranda
statements after being confronted with the evidence discovered during an illegal search of her
person. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that under the holdings of Luna and Downing,
Ms. Bills' statements were the inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree, notwithstanding the
giving of Miranda warnings, and should have been suppressed. Id.
Like in Luna, Downing, and Bills, Mr. Vivian's statements were made after being
confronted with evidence obtained as the result of his illegal seizure. Under the above precedent,
the Miranda warnings did not dissipate the taint of the illegal seizure, and Mr. Vivian's
statements should have been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree, absent a showing by
the State that an exception to the exclusionary rule applied. As set forth below, the State failed
to make that showing.
2.

The State Failed To Demonstrate That Mr. Vivian's Statements Were Admissible
Under The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine

The only exception to the exclusionary rule argued by the State, in the district court, 2 was
the inevitable discovery doctrine. (See R., pp.62-74; Tr., p.90, L.21 - p.91, L.7.) The district
court found that particular exception applied to the physical items discovered inside Mr. Vivian's
vehicle, and that those items were admissible. (R., p.85.) However, the State failed to show, and
the district court declined to find, that Mr. Vivian's statements were inevitably discoverable.
2

Because the State did not argue, below, for the application of other exception, including
attenuation, the State is precluded from arguing the application of such exception on appeal.
State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 226 (2019).
9

(See R., pp.62-74, 79-87.) As observed by the Court in Bills, "[s]imply because the physical

evidence is ultimately admissible does not mean the statements are also admissible." 166 Idaho
at_, 463 P.3d at 415-46. The Court further explained:
Statements are inherently different than physical evidence which, by its nature, a
defendant cannot change or ignore. Conversely, a defendant, after given time to
reflect upon her circumstances, may not make the same statements and may not
make any statements at all. The State does not point to any evidence in the record
to indicate Bills would have spoken and given the same answers absent the initial
illegality. This Court will not speculate as to if and to what extent Bills would
have made the same statements; the burden is on the State to demonstrate the
exception applicable to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, and the State has
failed to do so in this case.
Id.

Just as in Bills, the State failed to demonstrate that Mr. Vivian would have inevitably
made the statements, and thus failed to demonstrate the application of the only exception to the
exclusionary rule that it argued. Accordingly, just as in Bills, Downing, and Luna, Mr. Vivian's
statements should have been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. The district court
erred in concluding otherwise, and its ruling should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Vivian respectfully requests that this Court reverse, in part, the district court's
suppression order, and remand the case for entry of an order suppressing all statements made by
Mr. Vivian, including his post-Miranda statements, as the fruit of the unlawful seizure. He asks
this Court to vacate his convictions and remand his case to the district court, in accordance with
his plea agreement.
DATED this 19th day of October, 2020.
I sf Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

KAC/eas

11

